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Summary  findings
Under commulnal  farm production, there was ifttle  households on the basis of economic and dermographic
incentive to work hard: the communal system  changes among households. In other villages, houLseholds
guaranteed a livelihood, and there were few private gains  were granted much greater imminunity  against
from additional efforts. The reform that introduced  the  redistribution of any sort.
household responsibility system in China in the early  Similarly, villages differed in the degree to which
1980s sharpened individual work incentives by assigning  individual households could trade land among
specific plots and the rights to residual income to  themselves. Some villages did not regulate the practice,
individual households.  and others required village approval or prohibited land
However, the household responsibility system left  renral relationships.
unresolved questions about the reallocation of land over  Carter and Yao use simulated mnaximum  likelihood
time - questions that have become increasingly  miethods  to estinmate  hybrid panel models of the
important  (for both efficiency and equity) with the rapid  determinants of both marker-based and administrative
growth of the nonfarm economy.  reallocation of land. They also use them to estimate the
Carter and Yao use household and village data to show  insecurity-induced investment costs of market-based
that the initially egalitarian distribution of land is  reallocation of land.
becoming more dispersed over time.  They find that administrative reallocation responds to
In wlhat  has become a hybrid property rights system, in  the increasing inequality but nonmarket reallocations
some areas local village leaders (the cadre) were  come at a significant cost in forgone investment.
empower-ed  to periodically redistribute land between
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Section 1  Introduction
The legalization and subsequent widespread adoption of the "Household
Responsibility System" (HRS) in the early 1980s restored the peasant household as the
primary production unit in Chinese agriculture.  By assigning specific plots and residual
income rights to individual households, the HRS sharpened individual incentives for the
provision of careful labor and management.  Many authors (e.g., Lin, 1992 and
MacMillan, Whalley, and Zhu, 1989) have attributed the subsequent rapid growth of
agricultural output to the fact that the HRS broke the syndrome of the iron rice bowl in
which little labor effort was provided on the grounds that the prior communal production
system guaranteed a livelihood and private gains from additional efforts were sparse.'
While decisively individualizing residual income rights, the HRS more generally
resulted in a hybrid property rights system in which use, transfer and reallocation rights
were variously distributed between the individual land users and their villages that
remained the formal custodians of land that legally remained the property of the state. As
Liu et al. (1998) show, in some areas, local village leaders (the cadre) were empowered
to periodically redistribute land between households based on economic and demographic
changes among households, while in other villages, households were granted much
greater immunity against redistribution of any sort.  Similarly, villages differed in the
degree to which individual households could trade land among themselves, with some
villages not regulating the practice at all, whereas others required village approval or
i There has, however, been some dispute about the severity of the labor incentive problems under the
communal system and the extent the rapid agricultural of the 1980's was due to the HRS or the price
reforms  that shortly  followed  (e.g., see Puttennan,  1991).simply  prohibited  land  rental relationships.  Dong (1994)  has argued  that the
redistributive  power  of the cadre permits  land  to serve  an important  social safety  net
function,  an argument  ratified  by Burgess  (1997)  who econometrically  shows  that the
(presumably  administratively  maintained)  egalitarian  land distribution  in China
contributes  to low levels of undernutrition.  Kung  (1997)  presents  evidence  that peasants
prefer this mixed  to a fully  privatized,  redistribution-proof  system.
At the time of the HRS reform,  most villages  allocated  land to households  based
on the workforce  size, with adjustment  sometimes  made for the number  of its dependents
(Liu et al., 1998).  Given  this distributional  mechanism,  the initial post-HRS  distribution
of factor endowments-defined as the ratio  of contract  land to family labor-across
households  must have been fairly compressed.  Moreover,  with limited opportunities  for
off-farm  jobs or for urban  migration,  there must have  been relatively  little scope  for land
and labor  exchange  between  households. Even with limited  exchange  of these factors,
and irrespective  of the definition  of tenure  security  and transfer  rights, the intensity  with
which  land was cultivated  must have also been quite similar  across  households. 2 While
tenure  insecurity  may have dampened  incentives  for long term, fixed investment  under
the mixed HRS property  rights  regime  (an issue to be investigated  below),  the
productivity  impacts  of the secondary  features  of the HRS (e.g., limited  transfer  rights)
must have initially  been quite modest.
However,  the rapid growth  and industrialization  of the Chinese  economy  since
1980,  with its concomitant  withdrawal  of labor from agriculture,  would  be expected  to
put new pressure  on the fluidity  and efficacy  of the institutions  that allocate  rural land
2 Graynor  and Putterman  (199x)  note that Chayanovian  forces  will  tend to equalize  factor  proportions
between  households  even  when land is distributed  on a need as opposed  to a work  capacity  basis.
2and labor.  In this new environment, the absence of further administrative reallocation of
endowments with no increase in private land or labor transactions, would imply an
increasing dispersion in both the factor endowment and the factor intensity distributions.
An increased dispersion in the latter distribution would signal a potentially costly (static)
allocative inefficiency problem of under- (and over-) utilized land.  Moreover, as Carter
and Yao (1998) argue, in an environment of rapidly growing off-farm employment,
imperfectly transferable rights may discourage investment by households that expect to
exit or reduce their participation in agriculture in the near future, creating a sort of
dynamic inefficiency problem as well.
Punctuated by a slowdown in agricultural growth, these new challenges re-ignited
debate over rural property rights and the efficacy of the HRS and its hybrid property
rights regime.  In theory, an allocatively more efficient economy could be achieved either
by mechanisms that facilitate rental transactions between households in the face of an
increasingly disperse endowment distribution; or, by mechanisms that reallocate
distribution of land endowments such that no transactions are not required to equalize
factor intensity production across production farms.  Matching these theoretical
possibilities, proposals for further reform in China range from those that look toward a
more administrative mechanisms to adjust the endowment distribution, requiring a
recentralization of property rights, to those that propose to rely on decentralized, market-
mediated decisions and ask for the deepening of individual tenure security and transfer
rights needed to make this mechanism work.
While either market or administrative mechanisms could in theory resolve the
new challenges posed by rapid industrialization, this paper turns to empirical data to
3gauge how these mechanisms actually function in practice.  Using panel data on a sample
of 80 villages drawn from across rural China in 1988 and 1993, this paper tries to first
clarify the extent of these new land tenure problems.  Section 1 below first looks at the
evolving distributions of endowments and factor proportions in production over the 1988
to 1993 time period.  We find using a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that these distributions have changed over time, and
parametric maximum likelihood estimates show that the land-labor endowment
distribution has indeed become more disperse over time, revealing the uneven impact of
industrial employment growth and other demographic shifts.  At the same time, we find
that the that factor intensity distribution (in rice production) has, if anything, become
slightly less disperse over this time period, indicating that either centralized or
decentralized mechanisms are at least keeping pace with the challenge of demographic
and industrial change.
How then do these two competing mechanisms work and at what cost?
Addressing this first issue, Section 3 explores how and how effectively administrative
and market-mediated land reallocations respond to evolving opportunities to improve the
efficiency or the equity of the rural economy.  Simulated maximum likelihood methods
are used to estimate a hybrid panel data tobit model of land reallocations and land rentals.
Our strongest finding is that administrative reallocations seems to respond primarily to
increasing dispersion in endowment ratios (i.e., to equity concerns) and hence can be seen
to play a social insurance function.
4Section 4 then turns to see if this social insurance is indeed costly, using data on
rice-producing households to explore whether or not the tenure insecurity implied by
centralized powers of administrative reallocation significantly dampen investment
incentives. Using panel data methods to control for the likely correlation between tenure
regime and unobserved factors that influence returns to investment, the analysis in this
section shows that tenure insecurity significantly reduces investment.  Whether or not this
price is one worth paying for this insurance is an issue that will require additional
research, as discussed in the paper's final and concluding section.
Section 2  Changes in the Factor Endowment and Factor Intensity Distributions,
1988 to 1993
A well-functioning economy that obtains maximal output from the resources that
it utilizes will allocate inputs such that their marginal productivities are equal across
different uses and production units.  Were this not the case, total output could be
increased by shifting inputs from lower to higher productivity locations.  Under fairly
general assumptions about the nature of technology, dispersion in the ratio of labor
allocated to production per-unit area cultivated is a good indicator of the degree to which
an agricultural economy has succeeded in equating factor productivities across farm
units.  While it is unlikely that any real world economy will perfectly equalize factor
intensity across households, 3 panel data from a sample of households that were surveyed
in 1989 and again in 1994, permits us to explore whether the dispersion in factor
proportions has increased over time.  These same data also provide a window through
3  In measurement sense have trouble with unmeasured factor quality differentials that may make it efficient
to have different factor proportions.  Also expect some time of adjustment such that at any moment of time
be some variation.
5which  to view how  the endowment  distribution  (defined  as the ratio of household
contract  land per-family  member)  has evolved  under  hybrid  property  rights and the
pressure  of rapid industrialization.
The overall survey  covered  800 households  spread across  80 villages  drawn from
4 provinces  (Henan,  Jiangxi,  Jilin, and Zhejiang).4  Table 1 gives some  descriptive
indicators  drawn  from the approximately  400 surveyed  households  that primarily
cultivate  rice. As can be seen, as measured  by the coefficient  of variation,  both the
endowment  and factor proportions  distribution  became  more disperse  for the sample  as a
whole, with the coefficients  of variations  for these  two distributions  rising  from 74%  to
100%,  and 46% to 50%, respectively. Some  of this increased  variation  or dispersion  in
these  distributions  may well result from differences  between  villages. For example,  we
might expect  that more rapidly  growing  regions  will experience  an increase  in wage  rates
and a matching  fall in the labor intensity  of rice production. In order  to distinguish  this
source  of increased  variation  from that occurs  because  of, say, faulty allocative
institutions  within the local village  economy,  Table 1 also presents  an intra-village
coefficients  of variation  for the endowment  distribution  defined as:
nl,
(2-1)  it1  =  iht,Th  -i,)2  In,)If,,
h=l
4 The data used in this study come  from two  comprehensive  surveys  administered  in eight  provinces  of
China  in 1988  and 1993  for studies  of land tenure  evolution  and its implications  to agricultural
productivity.  Both surveys  have a household  and a village  questionnaire.  Villages  and households  were
chosen  from  the Rural Survey  Base maintained  by the Rural Survey  Team  of the State  Statistical  Bureau  of
China. A household  questionnaire  was administered  to ten randomly  selected  households  in each village
and asked questions  ranging  from land rights,  land  transactions  and annual agricultural  production  to off-
farm employment.  The village  questionnaire  asked  questions  about land  tenure arrangements  at the village
level both in the surveyed  years and in the history. In order  to eliminate  extraneous  noise,  the analysis  of
investment  and changing  dispersion  in factor  proportions  in production  relies only  on the subset  of villages
where  rice is the predominant  crop.
6where -cit is the contract land-family labor ratio for household h in village i in year t; n,f  is
the number of sampled households in village i in year t; and, the mean endowment ratio
for village i in year t isfit  = Xt*h, /n,,  . Letting t  denote the ratio of land to labor in rice
h=1
production, a similar expression defines the intra-village coefficient of variation in factor
proportions,  oy'.  As can be seen, the intra-village coefficient of variation of factor
endowments rose from 43% to 54%, whereas the intra-village the same measure for the
distribution of factor proportions actually declined slightly (34% from to 32%).
The Kolmogorov-Smimov statistics reported in Table 1 test the hypothesis that
the 1988 and 1993 distributions are statistically different from another-i.e.,  they test
whether or not the difference in the distributions signaled by the coefficients of variation
are large enough that we can reject the hypothesis that the 1988 and 1993 samples were
drawn from the same population distributions. 5 Table 1 reports the value of the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic and the figure in parenthesis gives the probability of
randomly generating a test statistic of that size under the maintained hypotheis that the
two distributions are identical.  At a 5% significance level the data thus reject the
hypotheses that the 1988 distributions are identical to the 1993 distributions for both
endowments and factor proportions.  However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
intra-village factor proportions distribution was the same in 1988 as it was in 1993.
There is, however, stronger evidence that intra-village distribution of factor endowments
5  The distribution free Kolmogorov-Smimov test compares the empirical cumulative density functions for
two distributions, asking if the largest difference that occurs between the two functions is so large that it is
unlikely to have happened based on random draws from identical distribution.
7has changed as we can reject the hypothesis of identical distributions at the 11%
significance level.
While these tests confirm which distributions have changed in a significant way,
they provide no information on the nature of the change nor its efficiency implications.
In order to gain a more precise (and visual) idea about the nature of these evolving
distributions, we assume that the factor endowments and factor proportions are
distributed according to a gamma distribution:
f  (Tht)  r(at  t,  I  Pt,
(2-2)
f(h  )  h  I-(at" Pt')
wheref(.)  is the probability distribution function for the distribution of factor
endowments, sit, and factor intensity, tit for household h in period t.  The gamma
distribution has been chosen for this analysis because it is a flexible distribution form that
can take on a wide variety of shapes, from normal to skewed to exponential, depending
on the value of the parameters of the distribution.  In addition, in order to explore
differences between the 1988 and 1993 distributions, we specify the two parameters of
the distribution to be linear functions of time:
(2-3)  a,  a0 +  a,Dt
where j=  T, £  and the binary variable D, takes on the value of one for 1993. Table 1
presents maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters defined by (2-2) and (2-3),
while Figure 1 displays the fitted or estimated probability functions.
8As can be seen in Table 1, the ML estimates indicate that parameters of both
distributions have changed over time in a statistically significant fashion.  Figure la,
which graphs the estimated endowment distributions for 1988 and 1993, shows that over
time the endowment distribution has indeed become more disperse, with greater density
in both the upper and lower tails of the estimated distribution.
Figure lb displays the estimated distribution of the labor to land (or factor
proportions) ratio for the sample of rice producers.  Already by 1988, the distribution of
factor intensity appears relatively disperse.  The mode for the estimated 1988 factor
proportions distribution is about 200 hours of labor per-mu. However, as can also be
seen, there is a not inconsequential number of farms that apply as few as 100 hours of
labor per-mu, acting as if labor is very scarce or dear. Similarly, there are a number of
units that behave in the opposite way, allocating as much as 400 hours of labor per-mu of
cultivated rice.  Either reallocation of land from the land abundant to the land scarce
farms, or reallocation of labor from labor abundant to labor scarce farms would be
expected to increase total agricultural output from the same resource base.  Assuming
constant returns to scale, an output labor elasticity of one third and equal use of non-labor
inputs per-mu on all farms, this estimated dispersion in labor intensity implies a 2.2%
yield loss (that is, yields would average 2.2% higher if all farm units produced at the
average labor intensity of 240 hours per-mu).
Compared to the 1988 distribution, the 1993 distribution has shifted right.  While
the upper tail of the distribution has increased (indicating that there is a greater proportion
of farms are cultivating their land more intensively in 1993), the lower tail has actually
shrunk over the 1988 to 1993 period.  Calculated under the same assumptions described
9in the prior paragraph, the yield loss implied by this 1993 distribution of labor intensity is
2.4%, slightly higher than the 1988 value.  Note that because average labor intensity was
higher in 1993 than in 1988 (309 versus 240 hours per-mu), the physical losses implied
by this labor intensity dispersion are greater than the 0.2% yield loss difference would
imply.
To summarize the findings of this section, we see that as expected under the
pressure of an industrializing economy and ongoing demographic change, the overall
endowment distribution has spread out over time, both across and within villages.
However, the impacts on distribution of labor intensity in production have been much
more muted.  While the overall level of allocative inefficiency in the rural, rice-producing
economy seems to have increased slightly (to about a 2.4% yield loss), most of that
change seems to have occurred between rather than within villages.  There is thus some
evidence that local institutions and mechanisms are coping relatively well with the
challenges of continuing industrialization and labor outmigration.
Section 3  The Responsiveness of Market and Administrative Reallocations to
Social and Economic Forces
As described in the introduction above, the endowment and factor proportions
distributions in rural China have been evolving under a variety of locally determined
institutional mechanisms.  While considerable controversy surrounds the relative merits
of decentralized, market-based mechanisms versus centralized administrative
mechanisms, empirical analysis of how either functions is scarce.  An important
exception is the study of Turner, Brandt and Rozelle (1998) who estimate the
10determinants of administrative land reallocation in China.  Their theoretical ruminations
suggest that cadre (and the village political process) may reallocate land for a variety of
reasons, ranging from equity goals to concerns to maximize the productivity of village
resources (which they term the "rational village" hypothesis).  In the analysis here, we
will follow their theoretical lead and test for the significance of both equity and efficiency
factors in motivating administrative reallocations.
While finding evidence in favor of what they term the "rational village"
hypothesis, Turner et al. (1998) also note that market and administrative mechanisms are
alternative means for achieving the same goal. In a simple OLS regression, they find that
a one unit increase in the amount of land reallocated through the market results in almost
unit reduction in the amount of land administratively reallocated.  However, they note
that this result is not to be trusted given that administrative and market-based
reallocations are simultaneously determined, and that any effort to explore their
determinants must properly account for this simultaneously. Unfortunately, within the
confines of their available cross-sectional data, they confront an intractable identification
problem that prevents them from identifying the determinants of both market and
administrative reallocations.
3.1  A Switching Regressions Model ofAdministrative  and Market-Mediated Land
Reallocation
The panel data available here suggests a resolution to this identification problem
and opens the way to an exploration of the responsiveness of market and administrative
reallocation to socio-economic forces.  Following the theoretical suggestion of Turner et
11al. (1998), we begin by noting that the percent of land that the village cadre would desire
to administratively reallocated in village i PRIOR to the commencement of agricultural
production in year t (denoted A,,-) may respond either to inequitable intra-village
dispersion in the endowment distribution, or to inefficient intra-village dispersion in the
factor proportions distribution that were observed to have occurred in the prior
production period, t-l.  Dispersion in the former distribution would signal the potential
for equity gains from reallocation, while dispersion in the latter would indicate that
reallocation would create efficiency gains.  The intra-village coefficients of variations
defined in Section 2 above suggests themselves as natural measures of this dispersion.  In
addition, the percent of village grain output that must be delivered to the state quota
system is likely to signal the severity of the pressure upon village cadres to attend to
productivity-dampening inefficiency.
The percent of village land that villagers would desire to transact through rental
contracts in period t ( Ri  *) take place AFTER any administrative reallocations and thus
responds to residual opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange that are created by
intra-village dispersion in the contemporaneous distributions of endowments and off-
farm, wage labor opportunity, where the latter is denoted Cy  '6
Table 3 presents descriptive statistical indicators of these dispersion measures, as
well as measures of the amounts of land reallocated by both administrative and market-
6 In one  of  the few studies  that focuses on private rental transactions in China, Carter and Yao (1998) use
standard household models to show that households become more likely to undertake land rental
transactions as their land:labor factor endowment ratio becomes more extreme and as the household enjoys
specific factors and skills that encourage it to specialize in either agricultural or non-agricultural activities.
The intra-village dispersion measures hypothesized here to influence the activeness of the village land
market capture in a simple way the forces identified by Carter and Yao's model.
12based mechanisms.  To calculate both these latter two measures, we first estimated the
total land stock in a village using the information on household land allocation together
with reports of land set aside by the village for future redistributions.  The reported rental
variables were calculated by summing up the absolute value of all rental transactions
(both land rented in and land rented out) and dividing by the estimated village land stock.
The administrative reallocation variable is the sum of all land reallocations (positive or
negative) reported by surveyed households over the 1988 through 1992 period.'  As can
be seen, on average just under 10% of the village land base was affected by rental
transactions in both 1988 and 1993.8 The total amount of land administratively
reallocated over the 1988 to 1992 period was about 11% of the village land base.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the administrative allocations that took place in
the wake of the 1993 cropping season.
Consistent with the data from the rice-producing villages analyzed above, the
intra-village coefficients of variation measures show on average an increase in the
variation in the endowment distribution, and a decrease in the dispersion of the factor
proportions distribution. 9 Intra-village variation in off-farm income (as measured by the
intra-village coefficient of variation in household non-farm earnings) increased
substantially over the 1988 to 1993 period. In 1988, intra-village variation was 93% of
mean household off-farm earnings.  By 1993, this figure had risen slightly to 98%,
7A  multi-year measure was used on the grounds that administrative reallocations are costly and therefore
take place only periodically.  A single year measure would thus be likely to understate the frequency and
amount of administrative reallocations.
s  As measured in the survey, land rentals include both transactions between individuals and temporary
lease transactions between villages and households in those villages that did not initially distribute all land
to households.
9  Factor proportions was here measured as the total household input of labor into agriculture divided by the
household's cultivated land area.
13although the intra-village standard deviation of off-farm earnings more than tripled over
this time period (reflecting an increase in average household off-farm earnings from 1350
to 4000 yuan).  The increase in both figures reflects the rapid growth of the non-farm
economy and the modest increase in household specialization between agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors.
While the dispersion measures reflect opportunities for gains from administrative
reallocation as well as gains from rental trades, the desired levels of these transactions
would be expected to depend on the permissiveness of the village-level property rights
regime.  As Liu et al. (1998) analyze in detail, in some villages the power of the cadre to
administratively reallocate land is highly encumbered by regulations that grant
individuals considerable tenure security and immunity against reallocation.  There is also
significant variation across villages in the degree to which individuals are permitted to
engage in rental transactions.  For the analysis here, we have defined two binary property
rights variables, D A, and D;t . The first takes on the value of one when individuals are
immune to redistribution, while the second takes the value of one when individuals can
rent land out to others with no or minimal restrictions.
In conformity with the preceding observations on the forces that potentially shape
market-mediated and administrative reallocations of land, consider the following
switching regressions specifications:
A*_ = ZA+  DA  A  A  A)  +
(3-1)  i  tI  DtZt1  +i
R,  =ZRpR  +±DR(ZR6  R) + g R±
where the z are the vectors of explanatory variables described above. Because the
property rights regimes are themselves endogenous (e.g., see the discussion in Liu et al.,
141998), it is unlikely that either regime switching or the dispersion vectors are orthogonal
to the error terms in (3-1).1" For example, villages close to the "contagion" of rapidly
growing privately owned or joint venture factories may tend to have both more
individualized property rights and greater intra-village dispersions in endowments, factor
use and opportunity. And yet this same contagion may directly induce more risk taking,
greater specialization and a more active land rental market.
Over the relatively brief period of our survey, we assume that the troublesome
portion of the error terms in the rental equation is time invariant and following the lead of
the panel data literature (e.g., Mundlak, 1978) we will assume that we can decompose it
as:
(3-2)  Iit =  R  + £it
where ER is purely white noise, uncorrelated with the Dit and Zit,  and that the troublesome
correlation between the error term is given as:
(3-3)  a R  =  +  r 
2
where  -R  =  R  Z  / 2 , and the y are nuisance parameters. 1'  In the estimation that follows
t=l
we will impose the following normality assumptions,  ER  - N(O, CR2) and Co  R  - N(0, a2).
While we can similarly decompose the error for the administrative land equation
as:
(3 4)  £itA  A  A
d  + 
8 it'
'o Note that because we use intra-village dispersion measures, we already control for many differences
between villages that might lead to inter-village dispersion.
-A  aR
Note that the xi  are being used as instruments for the latent component  .
15we would not be able to identify all the nuisance parameters in the analogue to equation
(3-3) because we have only a single cross section of observations on administrative
reallocations.  Instead we suppose that latent, time invariant component in the
reallocation equation, a  is a scalar multiple of that in the rental equation:
(3-5)  a'A  =A(,R)=A(xy  R+,)R),
where A is the scaling parameter.  Note that under (3-5) we are instrumenting for the
time invariant term in the reallocation equation using the village averages for the time
invariant term in the market rental equation.  We will assume that the white noise error
component in (3-4) is normally distributed as  - A-  N(O, a').  We turn now to develop a
method to estimate the system defined by (3-1)-(3-5).
3.2  Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Both the dependent variables in (3-1) are censored. Administrative reallocations
are costly to organize, and presumably do not take place unless there is a significant
backlog of equity- and, or efficiency-promoting reallocations.  Matching this expectation,
in the available data, only 53% villages engaged in any reallocation over the 1988 to
1993 period.
While land rental transactions are by definition more decentralized and
presumably less costly to individually initiate, it is also likely that an active land market
does not really come into existence until there is some critical minimum number of
potential transactions to be made.  This observation implies that rental transactions are
likely to be censored as well, and indeed the data show that no rental transactions are
recorded in 81% of the villages in 1988 and 63% in 1993.
16Reflecting this censorship, we can now defined the observable, censored
dependent amount of administrative reallocation, Ait, as:
A'  - A,if  A*_  > O
0, otherwise
A similar expression defines observable rental transactions, Rig. Unfortunately, in the
presence of this censorship, consistent estimation of panel data model defined above
cannot be attained using fixed-effect, analysis of covariance estimators.' 2
To get around this problem, we follow Gourieroux and Monfort (1993) and adapt
simulated maximum likelihood methods to our problems. Note that without loss of
generality, we can rewrite  (a/  in (3-3) as:
(DjR=  OVjR
where we assume that v iR  N(O,1), and 0 is a parameter to be estimated.  While we do
not actually observe v R,  we can simulate H replications of it using Monte Carlo methods.
Conditional on a given simulated value, uOR the full model to be estimated can be written
as:
A*  =ZA  fpA  + D  A(ZAj5A)+A[ZRy  +09th]+EA,  ifA*_ >0
0, otherwise
R  * =  Z  R+DR(Z6R)+[Ry  +OVRh]+  if RWR  > 0
0, otherwise
for which the likelihoods conditional on that simulated value are given by:
12  See for example,  the discussion  in Hsaio  (1986). Intuitively  the problem  is that differencing  time
periods  no longer  necessarily  sweeps  away  the time invariant  components  as R* and  A*  are no longer
necessarily  observed  in both periods.
17A  {A  J  J(  z,A  -D,(zA5  A) _A(iRy  + Ov)  R)X]}
(3-8)  it  3A)4o
it 3A,
and,
i'  D[(_  R p  R  DR(Z  R5  1  R  - _  -OL,)/  R  ]}
(3-9)  ~  ~~~~~it  3,R(
fl  [(i  R  R PR  _  DR(ZR'5R)_fiR  _  Ov,R)IR])
it 3R,
where Ao is the set of observations with non-positive administrative transactions, AI the
set with positive administrative transactions, Ro the set with no market rentals and RI the
set with positive rentals.  The functions O(.) and 5p(.) respectively denote the probability
and cumulative density functions for the standard normal distribution.
For Hreplications of u 1 , we can write the mean simulated log likelihood function
for the entire model as:
(3-10)  Li  =n[-hiL[  th(A  ILhR)]+hln[  ,  ILh  (__t  I  vL)].
H h=l  ti  H h=l  t  ti
Maximization of the mean simulated log likelihood will yield consistent estimators of the
parameters in the model above, and will yield a good approximation of the true
likelihood even with a moderate H, as long as different values of vi  are drawn for each
observation (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1993). In the analysis that follows, H is set equal
to 50.
3.3 Results
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates that result from maximizing (3-10) for
two slightly different model specifications. In addition to these SML estimates,Table 3
18also present estimates derived by simpler tobit methods that ignore the potentially
problematic relationship between the latent village effect (a 1) and the included variables.
For the administrative reallocation equation, this simpler tobit model reduces to a single
cross-sectional estimate, while for the rental equation it results in a simple pooling of the
two cross sections.
Like the SML-  1 estimates, the simple, pooled data tobit estimates using the intra-
village coefficient of variation to measure the dispersion in off-farm income earning
opportunities.  As the table shows, these simple pooled data tobit estimates more or less
correspond to our prior expectations about the forces that motivate land rental
transactions.  When the rental rights variable DR = 1 (indicating that individuals are free
to rent their land out), increasing dispersion of the endowment distribution is estimated to
increase the percentage of village land that is reallocated through the rental market.  The
variables are scaled such that an increase in the coefficient of variation for the
endowment ratio by 10 percentage points would increase the percentage of land rented by
a hefty 5 percentage points (recall that we have measured land rented as the sum of land
rented in and land rented out).  Increased dispersion in off-farm earnings has a not quite
significant but positive effect on rental transactions, according to these estimates,
although there is no significant effect of freer rental rights on this effect.
While these pooled results are sensible, as argued above they are likely biased as
they do not control for unobserved factors that may be simultaneously increasing the
demand for rental transactions and the demand for less restricted property rights.  To the
extent that these factors are invariant over the period of our study, then the panel methods
proposed above will permit us to identify the actual structural or ceteris paribus effect of
19changes  in trade opportunities  and property  rights on land rental activities. The
coefficients  on the terms used to instrument  for the latent  village effect  (the 2fz  ) are
nearly  all significant,  indicating  that  time invariant  characteristics  explain  a large portion
of the overall  variation  in land rental  activity. As the results  under  the colunm labeled
SML-  1 show,  the panel estimates  for the effect  of off-farm  earning dispersion  are similar
(positive,  but only significant  at the 20% level). While  the coefficient  on the interaction
between  endowment  dispersion  and freer  property  rights is similar  to the simpled  pooled
estimates,  the coefficient  that gives  the impact  of endowment  dispersion  on market
rentals  irrespective  of the property  rights  regime  has become  large and significantly
negative.
Turning  now to the estimates  of the percentage  of village  land  reallocated  by
administrative  processes,  we find that the simple  tobit, cross-sectional  estimates  do not
match  at all with prior expectations. Recall  that the property  rights  variable  D4 takes the
value of "1" when individuals  are immune  to periodic  redistribution,  so that we might
expect  terms  involving  D4 to carry  a negative  sign For the most part,  the coefficients  in
this regression  are insignificant,  although  the significant  coefficients  related  to the
endowment  dispersion  terms carry  precisely  the opposites  signs to what would  be
expected. Recalling  that we are using structural  and other  conditions  in 1988  to explain
reallocations  that took place between 1988  and 1993,  it may be that these results  reflect
administrative  reallocations  that took place only after a post-1988  change  in the property
rights regime. It may also reflect  the sorts of biases described  above.
The SML  estimates  are designed  to alleviate  this latter problem. As described
earlier,  these are not conventional  panel estimates  inasmuch  as the predicted  village
20effect variable from the rental market equation is used to control for the latent effect in
the reallocation equation.  The parameter A  that scales the rental village effect is negative,
as expected (i. e., latent factors that increase land rentals decrease land that is
administratively reallocated). As can be seen in Table 3, the SML-  1 estimates of
endowments, quotas and property rights now carry the expected sign, but they are
statistically insignificant.
The estimates shown as the SML Panel-2 estimates in Table 3 result from a slight
specification change.  As noted above, the intra-village coefficient of variation in off-
farm earnings changed only slight between 1988 and 1993 even though the magnitude of
off-farm earnings more than tripled over this period. Arguably, the intra-village standard
deviation in off-farm earnings is the better measure of the potential gains from exchange
in the land rental market.  As can be seen in Table 3, using this latter measure has
surprisingly little effect on the market rental equation.  However, it has a major effect on
the administrative reallocation estimates (note that this change in variable effects the
administrative reallocation equation only through its impact on the estimate of the latent
village effect).  As can be seen, the variables related to both quotas and endowment
dispersion become significant (statistically and economically) under this second
specification. While these results should be accepted with caution, they imply that village
cadre respond to both equity concerns in reallocating land (in the absence of property
rights forbidding reallocation, a 10 percentage point increase in the intra-village
coefficient of variation for the endowment distribution brings an estimated reallocation of
2.4% of village land), and that they reallocate more frequently when quota delivery
pressure is higher.  Individual immunity against such redistributions (DA=l) seems to
21block further  reallocations  for equity  purposes,  though  it has no effect  on quota-driven
reallocations. While  both of these results  are consistent  with a rational  village  model  of
reallocation,  the coefficient  on dispersion  in the land-labor  factor intensity  variable  has
becomes  significant  and counterintuitively  negative  in the SML-2  regression.
To summarize,  the statistically  conservative  panel data approach  used in this
section  has provided  uncertain  inference  at best concerning  factors  that shape  market  and
administrative  reallocation  of land.  The data in general  offer little insight  on the factors
that increase  land  rentals." 3 A clearer  picture emerges  about  administrative  reallocation,
however,  with both equity  and production-minded  (if not precisely  allocative  efficiency)
concerns  driving  these sorts of reallocations.
Section  4  Costs of Administrative  Reallocation:  Tenure  Insecurity  and
Investment  Disincentives
While  the analysis  in the prior section  found evidence  that administrative  land
reallocations  respond  to emerging  inequality  in endowments,  a potential  cost of this sort
of social insurance  is that by attenuating  the security  with which individuals  hold their
property  rights, it may reduce  incentives  for investments  that are attached  to land. The
fact  that insurance  (or any other good)  is costly  does not by itself mean that it is bad
public  policy  to provide  it. The more relevant  question  concerns  how costly  that
insurance  is relative  to its benefits  and to other  ways of providing  it. As a first step
toward answering  this question,  this section  turns to the household  data from the rice
producing  villages  in an attempt  to determine  whether  or not the prospect  of
13 These  disappointing  results  suggest  that  household  level analysis  is necessary  to gain insight  on the
forces  driving  rental  transactions,  such as that  in Carter  and Yao (1998)  discussed  in note 7 above.
22administrative reallocations dampens fixed investment.
The kinds of fixed investments observed in the data include wells, irrigation and
drainage ditches, ponds, application of organic fertilizers whose fertility effects persist
for several years, land leveling, soil improvement, and others.  The major cost associated
with all these investments is the labor hours devoted to producing them.  For each of the
rice-producing household in the sample, we calculated the total hours devoted to such
activities in both 1988 and 1993. Because 19% of the households in the sample did not
dedicate any labor to these investment activities, we adopt a tobit approach:
k 1* = Z,p  + 1J,if  k;, > °
(4-1)  kit={
0, otherwise
where  k*  is the desired (uncensored) level of fixed investment by householdj  in year t.
The factors likely to influence desired investment that we include in the vector Zk of
explanatory variables include a measure of land quality (% of land that is flat and can be
irrigated) a measure of farm fragmentation (the number of parcels held by the household),
measures of household endowments (age and education of household head, and
household contract land endowment per family member) and measures of the opportunity
cost of labor (non-agricultural employment opportunities).  Regional and time dummies
are also included in zk to capture the effect of otherwise unmeasured factors.  Finally the
property rights variable defined earlier, D',  that signals individual immunity against
administrative land reallocation is included as a measure of tenure security.  Table 2
above presents mean values for these explanatory different variables.
A conventional tobit estimator of (4-1) derived by simply pooling the data
23together form the two survey years is given the first column of Table 5. Aside from the
year and county dummy variables, none of the structural factors significantly explain
investment, with the exception of the land fragmentation variable.  According to the latter
estimate, as a farm shifted from only 1 parcels to the sample average of about 10,
investmetn would decrease by about s fragmentation (measured as the number of parcels)
increases, investment would decrease by about 1.5 hours per mu (or 25% of the sample
average investment level).  Surprisingly, the estimated effect of tenure security is both
small and statistically insignificant.
The consistencv of these tobit estimates can, however, be contested on the
grounds that the degree of tenure security is itself endogenous, and perhaps is itself
caused by the same factors that make investment more profitable.  In more
straightforward econometric terms, tenure security and perhaps other variables in
(4-1) may not be orthogonal to latent investment-promoting factors that are subsumed in
the error term.  Assuming that the latent, investment-promoting household and village
effects are invariant over the five year time period covered by the panel data, we can
again employ the panel data methods introduced in the prior section and decompose the
error term in (4-1) as
(4-2)  £ P = a  j+
where Et  N(O,  2  ) is random  noise. The troublesome  household  (and village)  effect,
a> , can be written as a linear function of average household characteristics,  ZkI
(4-3)  a.,  I  k
where  )  k  N(O,1), and y k andO  O are parameters to be estimated.  Again, this
24conservative econometric approach control for latent household effects by sacrificing all
between-household variation in the explanatory as instruments for the latent effects.  The
structural parameters of interest are estimated only using the within household variation
that occurs over time.  Unfortunately, as with the truncated models considered in the prior
section, standard fixed effect methods will not yield consistent parameter estimates and
we again turn to simulation based inference following the procedures outlined in the prior
section.
The results of the SML estimation of the system defined by equations (4-1) to (4-
3) are presented in the second column in Table 4.14  These SML panel estimates that
control for all time invariant factors at the household (and higher) level are broadly
similar to the pooled tobit estimates with the important exception that tenure security
variable has become large and statistically significant. The quantitative magnitude of the
is coefficient is such that it says that providing a household of immunity against
administrative land reallocation would increase investment attached to land by nearly 4
hours per-mu, an amount equal to about 60% of the sample average investment level.  For
an average farm comprised of about 10 mu, this estimate suggests that the provision of
tenure security would increase investment labor by a total of 40 hours a year for the farm
in its entirety. Whatever its benefits, the current mixed system of property rights would
seem to have some significant economic costs in terms of foregone investment.'5
14  These estimates  were estimated  using  20 replications  of the simulated  error,  Coy.
15  An economic  evaluation  of this investment  would  require  knowledge  of the marginal  returns  to
investment  as well as an estimate  of how much less  the investing  household  might do of other  activities.
The study  of tenure  security  by Carter  and Olinto  (1998)  finds  that  for capital-constrained  households  in
Paraguay,  tenure  security  indeed  boosts  investment  in fixed or attached  capital,  but it comes  at the cost  of
reduced  investment  in other  types of capital.
25Section 5  Conclusion: Market versus Administrative Reallocations
This paper began with the observation that while the HRS reforms in China
resolved incentive problems, the left the rural economy vulnerable to increasing
allocative inefficiency, especially as the non-farm economy began to boom and pull labor
out of the farm sector (see Putterman, 1992). Comparing 1988 with 1993, we indeed see
that the distribution of household land to labor endowments has become more disperse.
Reactions to this increasing dispersion could come through either administrative
reallocations that operate directly on the endowment distribution, or factor market trade
that prevents the increasingly disperse distribution from spilling over and generating the
sorts of allocative inefficiency that would appear as an increasingly disperse distribution
of factor proportions in production. While these two mechanisms are potential substitutes
for one another, they have nearly opposite implications for the post-HRS evolution of the
property rights system.  As Liu et al. (1998) argue, there is evidence that the local
evolution of property rights in rural China is in fact heading off in two disparate
directions, one where private rights are secured and made more marketable, and another
where individual rights become increasingly restricted and subject to more regulation and
reallocation.
Our efforts to use village-level panel data to gauge the forces that shape the
amounts of land reallocated administratively and via the rental market have been only
partially successful.  While Turner et al. (1998) find evidence of a rational village model
in which administrative land reallocations respond to both efficiency and equity concerns,
we find strong evidence only of the latter. Note, however, that to the extent that access to
local off-farm job opportunities in township and village enterprises is rationed in an
26egalitarian fashion (a possibility consistent with the labor market analysis in Yao,
forthcoming), administrative reforms that maintain an egalitarian endowment distribution
will also tend to preserve agricultural allocative efficiency.
Our analysis of private rental transactions was unable to satisfactorily identify the
factors at the village level that shape the activeness of the rental market, and hence we
have been able to put together a definitive comparison of the relative efficacy of an
administrative versus a market based resolution of the post-HRS agrarian question in
China. Interestingly, our comparison of the 1988 factor proportion distribution with that
in 1993 shows that the latter is slightly more compressed, indicating that in the aggregate
at least, rural allocative inefficiency is not increasing.  In both years, the cost of allocative
inefficiency is roughly estimated as 2.5% of agricultural production.
While our results make it difficult to compare the responsiveness of
administrative versus market based reallocations to village level disequilibria, one clear
difference between the two mechanisms is their impact on household tenure security.
Panel estimates suggest that increasing household tenure security by providing
households immunity against administrative reallocations boosts investment in land by 4
hours per mu.  While seemingly modest, this figure amounts to over 50% of the average
total labor time invested in land improvement and other forms of attached capital.  Given
the earlier evidence that administrative reallocations tend to maintain egalitarian land
access (and hence function as a social safety net as Dong, 1994 and Kung, 1994 and
others have argued), this finding suggests that the foregone investment and income are
the implicit insurance premia paid for this social insurance embedded in the land tenure
system.  Whether or not this embedded insurance is reasonably priced for what it
27delivers,  and whether  it constitutes  good social policy  is an important  question  that will
require  additional  research.
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29Table 1
Factor Endowments and Factor Proportions for
Rice Producing Households, 1988-1993
1988  1993
Endowment Distribution
Mean  0.72  0.85
Coefficient of Variation
Overall  74%  100%
Intra-Village  43%  54%
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test





ML Estimates of Density
Function
Shape Parameter, a
Constant  1.46* (0.049)
Year  -0.26* (0.062)
Scale Parameter, ,B
Constant  0.478* (0.022)
Year  0.189* (0.04)
Factor Proportions Distribution
Mean  239  309
Coefficient of Variation
Overall  46%  50%







ML Estimates of Density
Function
Shape Parameter, a
Constant  2.26* (0.077)
Year  -0.093 * (0.  107)
Scale Parameter, ,B
Constant  6.89* (0.248)
Year  1.27* (0.38)
"*"  indicate that the relevant parameter or test statistic is different from zero at the 5%
level.
30Table 2
Village and Household Descriptive Statistics, 1988-1993
1988  1993
Village Level Data
% Land Rented  9.2%  8.7%
% Land Reallocated, 88-93  11.3%
Intra-Village Coefficients of
Variation
Endowment Ratio  44%  46%
Labor Intensity  43%  40%
Non-Farm Income  93%  98%
[std dev in brackets]  [947 yuan]  [2775 yuan]
Structural Indicators
Quotas ( % expected  23%  21%
yield)





Unrestricted Rentals  73%  55%
Immune to  65%  53%
Reallocation
Household Level Data
Fixed Investment  6.3  6.4
(hours/mu)
Endowment Ratio  4.1  2.3
(mu per-person)
Average Household Age  32  35
Average Household
Schooling Years  5.4  5.8
Fragmentation
(number of parcels)  9.1  9.9
Land Quality  84.0  81.0
(% flat land)
31Table 3
Econometric Estimates of the
Determinants of Rental and Administrative Reallocations
Pooled or Cross-  SML Panel-1  SML Panel-2
Sectional
Admin  Market  Admin  Market  Admin  Market
Realloc  Rentals  Realloc  Rentals  Realloc  Rental
Structural Factors
Constant  0.30*  -0.53**  0.28  --  0.51**  --
(0.16)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.25)
Rights Indic-  -0.28  0.04  -0.21**  -0.26  -0.12*  -0.21
ator, iY,  or  (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.13)
DR
Time Effect  --  0.15  --  0.06  --  0.11
(0.09)  (0.06)  (0.07)
Quota  0.36  --  0.58  --  0.78**  --
(0.51)  (0.80)  (0.26)
DA*Quota  -0.85  --  0.01  --  0.01  --
(0.59)  (0.14)  (0.06)
Dispersion Measures
Endowment,  -1.09**  -0.15  0.17  -0.65**  0.24**  -0.63**
Cr  (0.36)  (0.21)  (0.12)  (0.24)  (0.10)  (0.26)
DA(R*)&  1.11**  0.49*  -0.33**  0.43  -0.61**  0.42
(0.40)  (0.29)  (0.17)  (0.26)  (0.19)  (0.28)
Factor  -0.02  --  -0.15  -0.42**  --
Intensity, u&  (0.33)  (0.13)  (0.16)
D.4*eTl  0.03  0.11  --  0.13  --
(0.34)  (0.09)  (0.08)
Off-Farm  --  1.79  --  1.12  --  0.13
Earnings, a  (1.28)  (0.86)  (0.48)
DR*ow  --  -1.42  --  0.01  -0.38
(1.57)  (1.11)  (0.49)
Variance Terms
cA or OR  0.04**  0.21**  0.05**  0.02*  0.05**  0.05**
(0.01)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
0  0.17**  --  -0.04
(0.05)  (0.09)
A  --  --  -0.007  --  0.05  --
(0.04)  (0.06)
*  Significant at the 10% level.
**  Significant at the 5% level.
Regional dummy variables and nuisance parameters (instruments for the aj) not reported.
32Table 4
Administrative Reallocation, Tenure Insecurity and Investment
Parameters  Pooled Tobit  SML Panel
Estimates
Structural  Factors
Constant  5.1  --
(3.4)
Year  -1.6*  0.47
(0.9)  (0.96)
Education  -0.18  0.88
(0.27)  (0.73)
Age  0.12  0.08
(0.8)  (0.13)
Fragmentation  -0.17**  -0.13 *
(0.06)  (0.08)
Land Quality  0.51  0.05
(0.9)  (1.2)
Endowment Ratio  -0.12  0.07
(0.15)  (0.19)
Non-Ag Employment  2.4  0.90
(3.4)  (7.6)







*  Significant at the 10% level.
* * Significant at the 5% level.
Regional dummy variables and nuisance parameters (instruments for the aj) not reported.
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